

# Learning Through Hiring: Labor Mobility as a Channel for Endogenous Growth

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# Motivation – Background



- Since Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), the diffusion of knowledge is an important mechanism in many endogenous growth models
- Labor mobility is often discussed as one of the main channels through which knowledge can spill over between firms
  - BOS – 52% of innovating firms report new workers were an important source of ideas for the innovation
- Panel data provides estimates of the spillover effects at the firm level
- But macroeconomic models don't consider this channel, or treat learning as exogenous

# Research Question



## This paper:

What are the macroeconomic implications of knowledge spillover through the labor mobility channel for long-run growth and heterogeneity in the economy?

- Develop a framework for assessing knowledge spillover at the macroeconomic level
- Endogenize the structure of the learning process – Labor mobility channel

# Approach



- Develop a general-equilibrium endogenous growth model
- Learning occurs through knowledge spillover via labor mobility
- On-the-job search-and-matching model with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Endogenized learning process:
  - Endogenous learning rate – vacancy posting rate
  - Endogenous dist. of new knowledge – dist. of worker search effort
- Calibrate the model to macro and micro data moments
- Study the BGP of the economy

# Preview of Findings



- **Counterfactual** – no knowledge spillover
  - Aggregate growth declines: 2.1% to 1.4%
  - More productivity/income inequality
  - No effect on firm size distribution
- **Social planner** – chooses search efforts to max the *marginal social value* of a firm
  - Less income/productivity inequality
  - Aggregate growth rate not significantly higher
  - Due to congestions in labor market
  - No effect on firm size distribution

# Related Literature



## Micro Evidence

- Kirker and Sanderson (2017) – Knowledge spillover estimates at firm level
- Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012), Serafinelli (2015)

## Endogenous Growth

- Endogenous search – Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012), Lucas and Moll (2012)
- Luttmer (2012, 2015)

# This Paper's Contribution



## **To knowledge spillover between firms**

- General-equilibrium framework
- Can examine long-run growth and distributional effects at the aggregate level

## **To endogenous growth models**

- Provides a structural interpretation to the learning process
- Learning rate is endogenised (vacancy posting rate)
- Distribution of new ideas is endogenised (search effort and distribution of workers)



# Model



# Model Overview



## 1) On-the-job search-and-matching model

- Large heterogenous firms (productivity, firm size)
- Workers moving from more to less productive firms facilitate the spillover of productive knowledge between firms
  - Incentive for workers to move up *and* down the productivity ladder
  - Firms post vacancies to obtain more labor and new knowledge

## 2) Endogenous growth framework

- Policy choices determine rate of firm learning
- When workers meeting a less productive firm, they can facilitate knowledge spillover, improving the distribution of productivity in the economy

# Learning From Knowledge Spillover



- Firm with productivity  $z$  meets a worker with productivity  $\tilde{z} > z$
- $y - z$  denotes the amount of knowledge the worker can transfer. Where  $z \leq y \leq \tilde{z}$  is drawn from the distribution with pdf  $T(y; \tilde{z}, z)$

## The distribution $T(y; \tilde{z}, z)$ reflects:

- Internal learning frictions
- External learning frictions – e.g. match between types of firms, scope of job to influence the firm
- Frictions in adapting the firm's current production methods

# Firms



## Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman:

$$\begin{aligned}
 r\Pi(z, l, t) = & \pi(z, l, t) + \frac{\partial\Pi(z, l, t)}{\partial t} \\
 & + \max_{\nu \in [0, \nu_{max}]} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} -c_\nu(\nu) \\ +\nu q(\theta) \frac{\partial\Pi(z, l, t)}{\partial l} \left( \int_{\tilde{z}=0}^{\infty} \int_{\tilde{l}} \mathbf{1}_{agree} h_\varepsilon(\tilde{z}, \tilde{l}, t) d\tilde{l} d\tilde{z} \right) \\ +\nu q(\theta) \mathbb{E}[Spillover] \end{array} \right\} \\
 & + \Psi(z, l, t) \frac{\partial\Pi(z, l, t)}{\partial l}
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\mathbb{E}[Spillover] = \int_{\tilde{z}} \int_{\tilde{l}} \left( \int_y \mathbf{1}_{agree} \begin{bmatrix} \Pi(y, l, t) - \Pi(z, l, t) \\ -m(y; \tilde{z}, z, t) \end{bmatrix} T(y; \tilde{z}, z) dy \right) h_\varepsilon(\tilde{z}, \tilde{l}, t) d\tilde{l} d\tilde{z}$$

# Workers



## Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman:

$$\begin{aligned}
 rV(z, l, t) = & \omega(z, l, t) + \frac{\partial V(z, l, t)}{\partial t} \\
 & + \max_{\varepsilon \in [0, \varepsilon_{max}]} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} -c_\varepsilon(\varepsilon) \\ +\varepsilon \theta q(\theta) \mathbb{E}[\text{Move}] \end{array} \right\} \\
 & + vq(\theta) \mathbb{E} [V(z', l, t) - V(z, l, t) | v(z, l, t)] \\
 & + \Psi(z, l, t) \frac{\partial V(z, l, t)}{\partial l}
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Move}] = \int_{\tilde{z}=0}^{\infty} \int_{\tilde{l}} \left( \int_y \mathbf{1}_{agree} \left[ \begin{array}{l} V(y, \tilde{l}, t) - V(z, l, t) \\ +m(\cdot) \end{array} \right] T(y; \tilde{z}, z) dy \right) f_\nu(\tilde{z}, \tilde{l}, t) d\tilde{l} d\tilde{z}$$



# Worker Compensation

Worker compensation separated into a wage for labor supplied and a knowledge premium for the net learning that will occur

## Wage ( $\omega$ )

- Stole and Zwiebel (1996) type bargaining over marginal product of labor

$$\beta_{\omega} \frac{\partial \pi(z, l, t)}{\partial l} = (1 - \beta_{\omega}) [\omega(z, l, t) - b(t)]$$

## Knowledge premium payment ( $m$ )

- Nash-bargaining over joint surplus

$$\beta \left( \Pi(z', l, t) - \Pi(z, l, t) + \frac{\partial \Pi(z, l, t)}{\partial l} - m \right) = (1 - \beta) \left( V(z', l, t) + m - V(\tilde{z}, \tilde{l}, t) \right)$$



# Kolmogorov Forward Equation

Evolution of the distribution of firms ( $f(z, l, t)$ ) and workers depends on policy choices:

- Firm's vacancy posting choice  $v(z, l, t)$
- Worker's search effort  $\varepsilon(z, l, t)$ 
  - Distributions of search effort  $h_\varepsilon(z, l, t)$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial f(z, l, t)}{\partial t} = & -f(z, l, t)\nu(z, l, t)q(\theta) \left( \int_{\hat{z}=z}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{l}} \mathbf{1}_{\text{accept}} h_\varepsilon(\hat{z}, \hat{l}, t) d\hat{l} d\hat{z} \right) \\ & + \int_{\tilde{z}=0}^z f(\tilde{z}, l, t) \nu(\tilde{z}, l, t)q(\theta) \left( \int_{\hat{z}=z}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{l}} \mathbf{1}_{\text{accept}} T(z, \tilde{z}, \hat{z}) h_\varepsilon(\hat{z}, \hat{l}, t) d\hat{l} d\hat{z} \right) d\tilde{z} \\ & + \frac{\partial \Psi(z, l, t)}{\partial l} f(z, l, t) \end{aligned}$$

# Existence of a BGP



## Sufficient, but not necessary, assumptions for a BGP:

1. The initial distribution of firms,  $f(z, l, t = 0)$ , has a Pareto tail with tail parameter  $\zeta$
2. Assumptions regarding the knowledge transfer function ( $T(\cdot)$ ):
  - 2.1 When firm  $i$  meets a worker from firm  $j$  ( $z_i < z_j$ ), there is a  $1/l_j$  probability the worker is able to facilitate knowledge spillover, and a  $1 - 1/l_j$  probability that the worker cannot
  - 2.2 Conditional upon knowledge spillover occurring, there is some chance (denoted by  $\tau$ ) the full amount of knowledge can be transmitted
3. There is an upper bound of the search effort of workers that binds for workers at highly productive firms



# Existence of a BGP



Under the previous assumptions, the aggregate growth rate of the BGP is:

$$\gamma = \frac{1}{\zeta} q(\ddot{\theta}) \tau \frac{1}{E[\ddot{\epsilon}]} \frac{\mathcal{F}}{\mathcal{N}} \int_l \int_{\tilde{z}} \nu(\tilde{z}, l) \phi_f(\tilde{z}, l) d\tilde{z} dl$$

# Calibration



# Simulation Model



## Features added to the model before simulating:

- Exogenous learning ( $\xi$ ) – Match dist. of productivity
- Brownian motion innovation shocks ( $N(\gamma_I, \sigma^2)$ ) – Match growth rate
- Firm entry and exit – consequence of innovation shocks
- Unemployment state – consequence of innovation shocks

New *unique* BGP growth rate:

$$\gamma = \gamma_I + \sigma \sqrt{2q(\ddot{\theta}) \tau \frac{1}{E[\varepsilon]} \left(\frac{\mathcal{F}}{\mathcal{N}}\right) \int_l \int_{\tilde{z}=0}^{\infty} \phi_f(\tilde{z}, l) \nu(\tilde{z}, l) d\tilde{z} dl + \xi}$$

# Fixed Parameters



	<b>Parameter</b>	<b>Model value</b>
$\rho$	Elasticity of substitution between goods	5
$\lambda$	Probability of death	0.0069
$F^{act}(t)$	Number of active firms	1
$r$	Real discount rate	0.04
$q_{cd}$	The Cobb-Douglas share parameter on vacancies in the matching function	0.5
$v_{max}$	Maximum rate of vacancy postings	1
$\sigma$	Standard deviation of Brownian innovation shocks	0.2
$\xi$	Rate of exogenous learning	0.05

# Calibrated Parameters



	Parameter	Value	Target moment	Moment value	
				Data	Model
$N$	Number of workers in the economy	16.5	Average firm size	13.7	14.7
$\psi_\nu$	Marginal search cost for firms	47.6	Share of firms posting vacancies	0.83	0.81
$\psi_\varepsilon$	Marginal search cost for workers	13.4	Share of workers searching with more than half effort	0.5	0.50
$q_{norm}$	Matching efficiency parameter	2.48	Share of labor supplied by new workers	0.194	0.21
$\gamma_I$	Growth rate of innovation shocks	-0.049	Aggregate growth rate ( $\gamma$ )	0.021	0.021
$\sigma_{new}^2$	Variance of inactive firm productivity draws	2.74	Relative productivity of new entrants	0.33	0.33
$\tau$	Probability of transferring all knowledge	0.0347	Tail parameter in firm productivity data	1.7554	1.755
$\frac{2}{2+\kappa}$	Mean of beta distribution for knowledge spillover	0.4719	Avg. productivity gain from knowledge spillover	0.327	0.327
$\beta$	Worker's relative bargaining strength	0.1	Ratio of average wage changes for workers move to more/less productive firms	0.436	0.438
$\delta$	Probability of becoming unemployed	0.050	Unemployment rate	0.12	0.13


# Results



# Distribution of Firms




## Distribution in productivity-labor space ( $\phi_f(z, l)$ )




# Distribution of Firms



## Dist. in prod. space ( $\phi_f(z)$ )



## Dist. of firm size ( $\phi_f(l)$ )






# Policy Choices




## Firms

### Vacancy posting rate ( $\nu(z, l)$ )



## Workers

### Search effort choice ( $\varepsilon(z, l)$ )



# Labor Movement Pattern



## Data

Hiring firm's prod. decile	Source of new employee hires: PFP productivity decile									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	0.14	0.17	0.1	0.1	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.1	0.07	0.08
2	0.13	0.17	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.06
3	0.1	0.15	0.18	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.06
4	0.11	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.1	0.07	0.07
5	0.1	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.07
6	0.1	0.14	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.09
7	0.1	0.13	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.09
8	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.11
9	0.1	0.1	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.14
10	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.1	0.13	0.24

# Labor Movement Pattern



## Model

Hiring firm's prod. decile	Source of new employee hires: Productivity decile									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.1	0.26	0.12	0.19	0.08
2	0.39	0.04	0	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.18	0.08	0.13	0.06
3	0.3	0.3	0.08	0	0.02	0.03	0.1	0.05	0.08	0.04
4	0.19	0.19	0.31	0.18	0	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
5	0.11	0.11	0.17	0.29	0.28	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
6	0.06	0.06	0.1	0.16	0.26	0.35	0	0	0.01	0
7	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.2	0.5	0	0	0
8	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.42	0.25	0	0
9	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.29	0.17	0.3	0.01
10	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.22	0.13	0.3	0.19

# Counterfactual Scenario



# Counterfactual – No Knowledge Spillover



## Question:

What effect does knowledge spillover have on the BGP of the economy?


- Assume no knowledge spills over.
  - Only benefit of new workers is additional labor
  - productivity improvement only occurs through innovation shocks and exogenous learning
- Recompute BGP and compare to previous results

# Counterfactual – Policy Choices




## Firms

### Vacancy posting rate ( $\nu(z, l)$ )



## Workers


### Search effort choice ( $\varepsilon(z, l)$ )




# Counterfactual – Distribution of Firms



## Dist. in prod. space ( $\phi_f(z)$ )



## Dist. of firm size ( $\phi_f(l)$ )



Aggregate growth rate:  $\gamma = 1.4\%$  vs  $2.1\%$  baseline

# Social Planner





# Social Planner



- Firms and workers split the surplus from knowledge spillover (through knowledge premium payment)
- Private returns from search  $<$  Social returns
- Encouraging firms and workers to under-search

## Question:

How much better would the economy be under the socially optimal search effort choices?

# Social Planner



## Social Planner:

Objective function: Maximize aggregate output net of search costs


- Unconstrained social planner problem is infinitely-dimensional
  - Policy choice for one firm depends upon distribution of policy choices in economy.
- Follow Lucas and Moll (2014) – Maximize the *marginal social value* of a firm
  - Choose policy rules to maximise the value of an additional firm at each  $(z, l)$  combination

# Social Planner – Policy Choices




## Firms

### Vacancy posting rate ( $\nu(z, l)$ )



## Workers


### Search effort choice ( $\varepsilon(z, l)$ )




# Social Planner – Distribution of Firms



## Dist. in prod. space ( $\phi_f(z)$ )



## Dist. of firm size ( $\phi_f(l)$ )



Aggregate growth rate:  $\gamma = 2.11\%$  vs  $2.1\%$  baseline

# Conclusions





# Conclusions

## Contribution

- General-equilibrium framework for analysing knowledge spillover between firms at the aggregate level
- On-the-job search-and-matching model embedded within an endogenous growth framework

## Counterfactual Scenario

- Knowledge spillover affects aggregate growth and dist. of productivity
- But not the distribution of firm size

## Social Planner

- Labor market matching technology is very important
- congestion in labor market limits aggregate growth